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Resilient Organisations 
 
The Resilient Organisations research programme aims to improve the resilience of New Zealand 
organisations to major hazard events.  Organisations manage, maintain and operate our infrastructure, 
create our economy and contribute to our society. The ability of organisations to respond effectively 
following a hazard event will have a large influence on the length of time that essential services are 
unavailable, and ultimately how well our communities cope with major disaster.  
Particular aspects of organisational response and recovery focused on by the research team include: 
how organisations plan for hazard events, their ability to direct resources effectively during crises, and 
the legal and contractual frameworks within which they will need to operate.  
The Resilient Organisations research programme is funded by the Foundation for Research Science 
and Technology (FRST) of New Zealand. 
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Executive Summary 
This report presents a critical review and analysis of issues involved in implementing electronic data 
and information sharing frameworks for organisations involved in emergency response and recovery 
activities.  Response to major emergencies involves multiple organisations collecting, collating and 
communicating data and information to enable better decision making that minimises social and 
economic impacts.  The challenges involved in co-ordinating an effective response to large scale 
events are compounded by the number and variety of organisations involved.  These complexities 
emphasise the need to develop robust yet simple frameworks for sharing information and 
communicating decisions within and between organisations involved in response and recovery 
activities.   
This report specifically focuses on organisations involved in response and recovery activities for the 
State Highway network during times of emergency, and how information sharing between these 
organisations might be streamlined to improve the effectiveness of that response and recovery.  The 
first section of the report reviews the New Zealand emergency management context, and those 
organisations involved in emergency response for the State Highway network in particular.  The report 
then describes a case study emergency event in Matata, where the interactions between organisations 
involved in restoring the road network were observed to better understand how response and recovery 
decisions are made, and the realities of information sharing during crisis.    
The report then reviews opportunities for improving communications and proposes a new framework 
for data and information sharing within and between organisations involved in response and recovery 
for the State Highway network.  The framework proposed utilises Transit NZ’s current inventory 
database (RAMM) to generate a Dynamic Geographical Information System (DGIS) for emergency 
response.  A Dynamic GIS differs from a traditional GIS system in that it has the capability to 
incorporate, display and share information continuously.     
The report also discusses challenges to implementing such a framework and the potential implications 
for organisations involved.  In particular it highlights that there are significant challenges to 
encouraging enhanced communication and data/information sharing, particularly given that most 
communications interoperability issues are not technical in nature.  Organisational cultures, 
differences in terminologies, and incompatibility of standard operating procedures all create barriers 
for progress.  However, perceived barriers can be reduced if technology is employed according to an 
organisation’s needs rather than the other way around.   
During design of the proposed DGIS framework significant focus was placed on the nature and 
background of involved organisations; the characteristics of their involvement in response and 
recovery activities; their data/information needs; their data/information sharing needs; and how 
organisations could/should share data and information.  It is hoped that by involving end-users during 
all development stages of the electronic data and information sharing framework, that researchers and 
end-users together, can develop an effective framework that complements the organisational structures, 
cultures and existing interfaces between the organisations involved.  
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1.  Introduction 
The New Zealand State Highway network is a vital lifeline for communities, providing access for 
people, goods and services around the country.  In times of disaster, the roading network becomes 
particularly important as a means of evacuation for getting into and out of the disaster zone, and also 
as a means into a disaster zone for emergency services, and supplies needed to restore and rebuild 
communities.  As highlighted in Risks and Realities [51], the roading network actually is one of the 
most critical lifeline services, as without road access, many of the other lifeline services (such as water, 
electricity, telecommunications etc.) cannot access their sites to effect repairs.  All of this points 
towards the need to have a road network that is resilient in the face of disaster. 
Resilience of the roading network has two aspects: the vulnerability of the road network to 
disruption during disaster, and the time it takes for the road network to be restored following disaster.  
This report primarily focuses on this second aspect of resilience, the speed and efficiency with which 
the road network is restored following major disaster.   
Restoration of the road network requires multiple organisations to work together, most likely in 
conditions of high personal and organisational stress, significant uncertainty as to the extent of the 
damage, limited communications, with key staff members unavailable, and without access to normal 
support services such as fully effective IT systems or even potentially hard-copy files if offices are 
inaccessible.  It is therefore as much an organisational challenge to restore road transport services, as a 
technical or construction issue. 
This report explores communication channels between the organisations involved in response and 
recovery activities for the State Highway network during times of emergency, and how these 
communication channels might be streamlined to improve the effectiveness of that response and 
recovery.  The first section of the report reviews the New Zealand emergency management context, 
and those organisations involved in emergency response for the State Highway network in particular.  
The report then describes a case study emergency event in Matata, where the interactions between 
organisations involved in restoring the road network were observed.  The report then reviews 
opportunities for improving these communication channels and proposes a new framework for data 
and information sharing within and between these organisations during times of crisis.  The report also 
discusses challenges to implementing such a framework and the potential implications for 
organisations involved. 
It should be noted that this framework specifically focuses on information sharing between 
organisations in the response and recovery of the State Highway network. Although it is recognised 
that the methodology will eventually need to cover organisations managing the entire road network, 
the number of different Councils involved in managing local roads significantly increases the 
complexity involved in understanding and modelling the information management structures required.  
For that reason, this study focuses only on the State Highway network, but the methodology employed 
could later be extended to the full road network if desired.  Even though State Highways (SH) make up 
only a small portion of New Zealand’s total road network, they are very important because traffic 
flows are much higher on SHs than on local roads.   
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2.  Current Practice and Issues in Disaster Response 
2.1 Emergency management in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) is a 
semi-autonomous body within the Department of Internal Affairs.  MCDEM has over-arching 
responsibility for developing and maintaining the preparedness of the New Zealand community for 
any natural and technological hazards or disasters [1]. Created in 1999 from the former Ministry of 
Civil Defence, MCDEM also provides policy advice to the Government [43]. 
In 2002, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act established a national and regional 
framework in which an emergency management strategy and plan were adopted. One of the features of 
the Act is the establishment of CDEM Groups based on regional council boundaries, and the 
requirement that a risk management-based approach be adopted.  CDEM Groups are consortia of local 
authorities, emergency services and health boards in each region.   
The CDEM Act (2002) requires every local authority to plan and provide for Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management (CDEM) within its district, and to ensure that it is able to function to the 
fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency. One 
of the features of the Act is that this requirement also applies to lifeline utilities and central 
government departments.  MCDEM works in coordination with local and regional governments, 
utilities and the emergency services involved in CDEM.  MCDEM’s Director acts as Chief Executive 
of the Ministry in its day-to-day operations. In cases of national emergencies, the Director has special 
powers defined in the legislation.  
In the event of a Civil Defence Emergency declaration, the CDEM Group (or local) Civil 
Defence Controller co-ordinates the response and makes decisions about key response actions after 
communication and consultation with the emergency services, health agencies and key lifeline 
organisations. The regional and national CDEM Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs) interact with 
these organisations to facilitate and support decisions on prioritisation of response activities. Relevant 
data/information from all the above organisations is expected to be shared with CDEM agencies to 
facilitate decision making.   
 
2.2  Interaction between CDEM Agencies and Transit NZ 
New Zealand has about 10 thousand kilometres of State Highway network. These roads are a 
national asset worth approximately NZ$12 billion and Transit NZ is responsible for maintaining and 
enhancing these assets. 56% of the annual budget is allocated for the maintenance and rehabilitation of 
existing roads.  
Typically, Transit NZ appoints Consultants to undertake technical services to determine work 
requirements according to Transit NZ Regional office’s directives, and Contractors for carrying out the 
physical works [44].The State Highway network is divided into seven regions, each with their own 
Consultant and Contractor arrangements.   
This structure provides the State Highway network with some resilience during emergencies in 
that many of these Consultants and Contractors are national or sometimes even international 
organisations.  This means that resources can be brought in from other areas to boost resources 
available to an affected region during the crisis.  However this structure also adds complexity that 
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needs to be recognised and managed.  As the number of organisations involved in effecting response 
and recovery increases, particularly if an emergency spans more than one region, communication and 
sharing of information within and between organisations becomes more complex to manage. 
During an emergency situation it is the responsibility of the Contractor to carry out the physical 
repairs and reopen the road to the traffic as soon as possible. The Consultants provide oversight and 
technical advice to the Contractors. The Consultants also interact with representatives of Transit NZ, 
and where appropriate, CDEM agencies.  This structure, whereby Transit NZ, the Consultant and 
Contractor (and where appropriate CDEM agencies) all need to work together and share information 
to inform real-time decision-making in response to events, provides an excellent case-study for 
developing a data/information sharing framework. 
Emergency situations are classified by Transit NZ into 3 levels according to the time required for 
road reopening: small (a specific part/segment of the State Highway network is affected for an 
approximate duration less than 6 hours), medium (multiple parts/segments of the State Highway 
network are affected for up to a day) and large events (severe damage to the State Highway 
Network, other lifeline infrastructure systems and life treating situations are observed, 
prompting Civil Defence to dictate response and recovery priorities). Based on emergency 
procedure manuals [44], Table 1 summarises the roles Transit NZ and CDEM agencies play for these 
different events. 
Table 1. Transit NZ and CDEM participation for different types of events. 
 
  Type of Emergency 
  Small Medium Large 
 
 
Transit NZ 
Stand-by unless the 
emergency affects 
SH system  
SH Emergency 
Procedure and 
Contingency Plan fully 
applied. 
SH Emergency Procedure and 
Contingency Plan are partially 
applied.  Define response 
priorities for the SH network. 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation   
 
CDEM 
Agencies 
N/A 
- Local EOC /CDEM 
groups play a 
monitoring role; and 
- NCMC is kept 
informed about event 
characteristics 
Civil Defence Emergency 
declared.  Local, Regional or 
National Civil Defence 
Controller defines overarching 
response priorities and has the 
ability to direct resources if 
necessary 
 
A large event refers to a situation in which severe damage is observed and CDEM agencies may 
influence the priorities for response and recovery activities to reflect specific community needs. When 
a civil defence emergency is declared during a large event, Transit NZ needs to work in co-ordination 
with CDEM agencies. Transit NZ headquarters in Wellington is also involved in a large event and it 
reports to Land Transport NZ and the Ministry of Transport (MOT). In these situations, Transit NZ 
also interacts with the community through individuals, external organisations such as 
telecommunications, energy, water, hospitals and the media etc.  
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c show a representation of the organisations involved in different scaled 
events. The challenges involved in co-ordinating an effective response to a large scale event are 
compounded by the number and variety of organisations involved.  
Organisations involved in response and recovery activities need a large variety of information. In 
order to act in a coordinated and effective way organisations require access to data and information 
characterising the disaster’s intensity, location and related damage, as well as the availability of human 
and physical resources. Organisations will have their own particular information needs, which may be 
different for each level in the organisation. For example, Transit NZ Headquarters’ personnel in 
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Wellington will need general road closure information such as summary of damage, expected opening, 
forecasted recovery cost, etc. On the other hand, the Transit NZ network engineer will need access to 
much more specific information about damage, work progress, costs and resources availability. Based 
upon the available information, both sections will make their decisions on allocating the resources 
over time and space.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SMALL EVENT 
(e.g. Car accident, 
debris blocking road, 
etc) 
ConsultantsTransit NZ
Contractors 
Local/Regional 
Authorities
Lifeline 
organisations 
ConsultantsTransit NZ
Contractors
MEDIUM EVENT  
(e.g. Flooding, bridge 
collapse, snow, etc) 
Figure 1a: Organisations involved in a small event response 
Figure 1b: Organisations involved in a medium event response 
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  LARGE EVENT (e.g. Earthquake, Volcano eruption, Tsunami, Regional flooding etc)
Local/Regional 
Authorities 
Lifeline 
organisations 
Transit NZ Headquarters 
Land Transport NZ NCMC 
Ministry of Transport DES group 
CDEM 
group 
Regional/CDEM Group 
EOC 
ConsultantsTransit NZ
Contractors 
Figure 1c: Organisations involved in a large event response 
TEMCE 
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3.  Case Study: Organisational Response Observed in 
Matata 
In order to better understand how response and recovery decisions are made, and the realities of 
information sharing issues during crisis event, the research team sought permission to act as ‘fly on the 
wall’ observers during the flooding and debris flow events around Matata in May 2005. 
After initial TV news reports of the Matata events evolving, members of the research team 
contacted the regional office of Transit NZ in Hamilton about the event to establish in situ interaction 
with the involved parties and obtain permission to observe the response activities in Matata. The 
remainder of this sub-section is based on in situ interviews and examination during two visits (May 20 
and May 26/27) to the damaged area.  
Matata is a seaside village of approximately 500 people in the Bay of Plenty region, North Island 
of New Zealand as shown in Figure 2. Matata is located halfway between Whakatane, which is a 
forestry industry region, and Tauranga, where one of the busiest ports of New Zealand is located.  
Whakatane and Tauranga are connected by railway and road, with the State Highway (SH) 2 being the 
most important part of the network, with heavy traffic observed daily in both directions.  
80 0 80 160 Kilometers
NZ Coast
 
#
#
#
#
#
##
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
Matata
TAURANGA
Whakatane
State Highway NZ coast
SH Affected area
4 0 4 8 Kilometers
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) (b) 
Figure 2: Location maps: (a) New Zealand and affected region; (b) Matata Township  
The 2005 Matata township flooding was a small-medium emergency event in which practical 
issues in data/information sharing among roading organisations were observed. In contrast to previous 
year’s events that caused widespread damage in the Bay of Plenty, the 2005 event was confined mostly 
in the Matata township and its nearby coastal area, which comprises a portion of SH 2 known as the 
“Matata Straight” (approximately 5 km of road). As emergency response was concentrated in very 
specific parts of the roading infrastructure, involved organisations and their resources were 
coordinated locally by the Transit NZ area engineer and Consultant.   
  
 
3.1 Event Chronology 
On the evening of May 16, 2005, MetService 
issued a heavy rain warning to the local (Whakatane 
District Council) and regional authorities (Bay of 
Plenty Regional Council).  They also notified all 
infrastructure and lifeline providers in the region, 
including Transit NZ offices in Hamilton and Gisborne. 
In the early hours of May 17, the Transit NZ area 
engineer and the Consultant engineer, who were 
coincidently meeting together in Whakatane, received 
initial reports from the local community and Transit 
NZ Contractors about partial road closures on SH 2 
due to water on the road surface and localized slips 
blocking traffic (See Figures 3, 4 and 5).  The fact that 
both the Contractor and Consultant representatives 
were together at the time the event escalated, 
simplified subsequent communications significantly 
and allowed for shared decision making.   
Figure 3: Matata Straight. Trucks stranded 
between Hauone and Pikowai Bridges as of 
10:00hrs, 18/05/2005 (Source: Transit NZ – 
Hamilton Office) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Pikowai Bridge SH 2 RP 
209/3.040 - Photo taken at 10:00hrs 18th 
May 2005. (Source: Transit NZ – Hamilton 
Office) 
 
 
Figure 4: Hauone Bridge SH 2 RP 209/3.040 
- Photo taken at 10:00hrs 18th May 2005. 
(Source: Transit NZ – Hamilton Office) 
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An additional contracting crew was mobilized to the location of the road closure from various parts of 
the region via mobile phone. SH2 was reopened approximately 12 hours after the first warnings were 
received. The poor weather conditions continued overnight however and during road inspections the 
following day (May 18) the Transit NZ area engineer and Consultant engineer together, actually 
witnessed the washout of one bridge embankment.  
Subsequent reports from road users about more washouts prompted the Transit NZ area engineer 
and the Consultant engineer to hire a helicopter in Whakatane and conduct a fly-over inspection. 
Immediately after the inspection, complete road closure of SH 2 was declared and supplementary 
personnel and equipment from the Transit NZ Contractor were requested.  
Up to that point in time, communications and exchange/sharing of data and information were 
very limited. Transit NZ Headquarters in Wellington had been informed of the road closure, without 
any precise estimation of the reopening time. The area engineer liaised with local and regional 
councils sharing the same level of information available to Transit NZ Headquarters. Press releases 
were given to the media about the road closures (Appendix A shows a media release that describes the 
roading conditions on May 23). Interaction between the Transit NZ area engineer and the Consultant 
engineer occurred almost instantly as both were in situ coordinating and making decisions together.  
The Consultant engineer, originally based in Matata, reported back to his office in Whakatane via 
mobile phone communications and using his deputy road technician. Consultant’s reports were used to 
produce maps of road closures and initial estimates of damage and costs (Appendix B shows a road 
closure map produced by the Consultant on May 23). Transmitted data comprised very general 
instructions referring to road assets per kilometre. No specific data on previous road asset conditions 
(e.g. location and characteristics of roading elements) were readily accessible to the involved parties 
(Transit NZ, Consultant and Contractors).  
 
Figure 6: Matata Township – Coast to land view, early hours of 
May 19, 2005 (Source: Transit NZ, Hamilton) 
On the afternoon of May 18, a Civil Defence Emergency was declared by the Western Bay of 
Plenty Emergency Management Office. Subsequently the Whakatane District Council also declared a 
state of local emergency for the Edgecumbe-Tarawera Ward (Matata township) on the evening of the 
same day (May 18) (See Figures 6 and 7).  Late that night, a band of intense rain passed over the 
catchments behind Matata and triggered many landslips (debris avalanche), which destroyed 27 homes 
and seriously damaged 87 properties [45].  
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Figure 7: Matata Township, early hours of May 19, 
2005 (Source: Transit NZ, Hamilton Office) 
Initial response actions commenced immediately.  Resources were already available in the area 
for dealing with the earlier road closures. However, a major drawback was a lack of suitable gear for 
operating during the night because batteries for the spotlights available were faulty. Communications 
relied almost entirely on cellular mobile telephones and radio telephones (RT’s). All involved parties 
(Transit NZ engineer, Consultant and Contractor) were using Telecom cell phones, which had good 
coverage in the area. Conversely, the research team had some difficulties contacting the response 
parties, because our Vodafone cell phone had very poor coverage in some areas of the affected region. 
Radio communication was largely used between the contractor’s crew. Localised communications over 
short distances, such as for the direction 
of machinery and personnel were very 
well suited to low frequency RT 
communications. Nevertheless, during 
times of confusion, face-to-face 
communications proved to be the most 
effective means of getting activities 
underway.  
The landslips in Matata and 
complete closure of SH 2 created 
difficulties in transporting equipment 
and personnel from Tauranga in order to 
effect repairs (See Figure 8). Alternative 
routes through mountainous areas had to 
be used, which incurred delays in the 
response actions. Nevertheless, the 
contractor mobilised a considerable 
number of personnel (over 50 people) 
and machinery (25 heavy load trucks, 10 
diggers, 4 bulldozers, 1 grader, etc).  Figure 8: Transit NZ deployment of resources in Matata, May 20, 2005 (Source: Transit NZ – 
Hamilton Office)  
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On May 20th SH 2 partially reopened overnight (5pm to 5am) for use by heavy and commercial 
traffic only (see Figures 9, 10 and 11).  On May 30th, 14 days after the initial closures, SH 2 was 
completely reopened to general traffic. At that point in time, Transit NZ had no specific assessment of 
road repair costs, but approximate estimates ranged from 2.5 to 5 million dollars. Daily information on 
damage and resource deployment was recorded by the consultants. It consisted mainly of a list of 
damaged assets, their priorities and recommended treatment. This information was shared with the 
contractor using paper.  
 
 
 Figure 10: Transit NZ deployment of 
resources in Matata, May 20, 2005 
Figure 9: Transit NZ partial re-
opening of SH 2 May 20, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Transit NZ deployment of resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Organisational coordination and data/information sharing during 
the event 
During the response activities, members from the research team observed interactions between 
Transit NZ, Consultants and Contractors. In comparison with previous hazard events (such as the 2004 
flooding in the Manuwatu-Wanganui region [42]), flooding and damage in this instance were much 
more localised. This simplified the allocation of resources somewhat. The prioritization process 
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consisted of visual inspection by the Consultant technician and the Contractor representative.  
Together they listed assets and decided on a ranking and treatment options, without explicitly 
considering the previous state of the assets or the costs of repairs.  
The Transit NZ Consultant noted that there would be clear gains in efficiency if Contractors knew 
the exact location and prior characteristics of the roading elements such as signage, culverts, etc. This 
mainly reflects the limitations of the Road Assessment Maintenance Management (RAMM) 
information database employed in Transit NZ daily operations. Ironically, Contractors and Consultants 
managed to download television reports about the events from the internet using their mobile phones, 
but they were unable to determine what was underneath the mud.   
Observation of communications and data/information exchange/sharing during the Matata events 
indicates that informal linkages and assessment were the dominant form. Involved roading 
organisations depended heavily on individuals’ previous knowledge about the area and assets. 
Obviously, previous knowledge was very important, but there are concerns about how efficiently it can 
be employed on its own to solve more complex problems such as would be the case in a larger scale 
event. Moreover, “common sense” compensating a lack of information was constantly employed.  
On the other hand, the current information system (RAMM) was perceived as not suitable for 
coping with the dynamic nature of such an event. This has probably forced Transit NZ, the Contractors 
and Consultants to respond as observed. RAMM is largely employed in asset management and 
maintenance of State Highways, therefore it is programmed and organised to support medium term 
decision-making. It gathers road asset information on a kilometre length basis. Each highway is 
divided into multiple segments, which are subdivided into kilometre units, to which all roading 
elements (post signs, culverts, drainage elements, pavement, etc) are referred to. Nevertheless, during 
an emergency event, kilometre based reference to roading assets has very limited information value, 
because damage may have altered the whole arrangement and location of roading elements. For 
example, the contractor may want to replace a stop sign using RAMM-kilometre reference, but the 
road alignment has been completely changed due to mud and debris and it becomes impossible to 
identify sign posts and any other references required to perform the original task. One other example 
indicating RAMM’s deficiency in supporting emergency decision making is that during the observed 
deployment heavy machinery no data was retrieved from RAMM in order to indicate, for instance, 
original grading and alignment.   
Another issue observed during the case study was the potential fragility in a larger scale event of 
the communication systems used to manage the response.  The predominant means of communication 
between the Transit New Zealand engineer, the Consultant and the Contractor was via either face to 
face meetings or by cellular/mobile telephones.  The RT network was used also for communications 
during the response; however it was only used for communications between members of the same 
organisation.  In a large scale emergency event the cellular/mobile phone network is likely to be an 
unreliable means of communication; cell phone towers may be damaged, there may be poor network 
coverage at the site; or the network may become simply overloaded as the volume of calls made by the 
general public escalates during times of crisis.  The development of any emergency communications 
framework will need to consider how reliable voice communications between the responding 
organisations can be facilitated. 
There are significant opportunities for improving the way that information on road status is 
shared during an emergency.  Appendix B shows an example map of road network status that was 
produced during the Matata event.  Standardising and setting up pre-formatted templates for such 
maps would not only save time and effort during an event but would also enhance the usability of the 
information on the maps.  For example, in any map of this kind, cartographic standards should always 
be applied including the use of scales, referencing the map to clearly identify where the mapped area is 
located, and the use of standardised symbols to avoid misinterpretation. Visual strategies should be 
developed where possible to convey information so that the need for text commentary is minimised.  
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As highlighted by Peter Wood [50] emergency management requires information to be visualised so that 
it can be interpreted quickly, easily and consistently across the different organisations involved in 
response.  This requires integration of and interoperability between datasets, including the use of 
common standards and symbols, compatible reference frames, and protocols for sharing and protecting 
data and information. 
Overall, management of the response and recovery observed from the Matata event was very 
effective.  The people on the ground knew each other very well, and this helped to facilitate shared 
decision making and communications.  In a larger scale event however, those managing the response 
and recovery may not know each other so well, particularly where external people are brought into the 
area to support local teams.  In a larger scale event, where more organisations are involved and the 
situation is more complex, there is likely to be a need for more formal structures for planning and co-
ordination.     
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4.  Opportunities for Improving Information Sharing 
As part of this research, an international literature search has been undertaken to seek out international 
best practice and innovations for information sharing between organisations to enhance coordinated 
decision making in times of crisis.  International research on intra- and inter-organisational issues in 
emergency response is typically concentrated on three main topics, namely:  
• organisational coordination;  
• emergent technologies and techniques in data/information processing;  
• evacuation planning.  
The following subsections summarise the key findings from that literature review. 
 
4.1 Organisational coordination 
Organisational co-ordination refers to the ways that organisations work together, sharing information 
and contributing to integrated decision making to achieve a common goal.  The main themes found in 
the literature regarding organisational co-ordination during emergencies are as follows. 
• Lack of coordination reduces response efficiency. Various international reports of 
recent events in the USA, Costa Rica, Turkey and Canada show that bringing together 
organisations and making them working together is crucial in saving lives and reducing 
disruption. These studies point out that organisations struggle during response activities, 
because most problems are originally related to urban and regional planning and cultural 
differences between organisations, i.e., coordination is not only about operational issues 
(who/how does what) but also about preparation before the event. [1] [2] [3] [5] [6] [7]  
Organisations that have established a culture of working together in developing their response 
plans are more likely to work effectively together during a crisis event.  Not only will their 
response plans be better integrated, but the principles and ethos that these organisations bring 
to the response are also likely to be better aligned. 
• Growing concern over the need to obtain and share data during emergency 
events. Organisations responding to an emergency event have to make difficult decisions 
about personnel and equipment deployment. The accuracy and reliability of these decisions 
obviously depend on the quality and availability of information (e.g. a roading consultant 
deciding whether to close a bridge or not, based upon reports from the public). The scientific 
reports indicate that sometimes organisations have access to all sorts of information. However, 
they also demonstrate that abundance of information does not necessarily mean useful 
information (e.g. having all the structural details of all bridges and not knowing the traffic 
flow on them will not help in assessing the closure or not of a specific bridge). Many 
organisations have expressed the view that data and information management is critical for 
performing their activities and that access to more and better quality data, as well as having 
the means to share that data with others, is essential for improving the effectiveness of their 
response. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]. 
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4.2 Emergent technologies and techniques in data/information 
processing 
Many organisations are already taking advantage of significant advances in various technological 
areas such as telecommunications and geo-information technologies. The main themes found in the 
literature regarding emergent technologies and techniques are as follows. 
• Tools such as Geographical Information Systems (GIS), Global Position Systems 
(GPS) and Remote Sensing are already part of the emergency management and 
response reality in various countries. Mostly, these tools have been used in before and 
after assessment of disasters, as well as decision-making processes, risk and vulnerability 
assets, network operations and traffic management. Many reports claim that without tools such 
as GIS quick evaluation of immediate response needs would not be possible, because damage 
are usually observed in large areas and of difficult access [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]. 
• The real potential of tools such as GIS, GPS and Remote Sensing has been 
properly used yet. Most commercial desktop software is inefficient in representing the 
complex characteristics of response systems. For example, GIS databases are often employed 
in order to present damage in disaster affected areas and discuss preliminary response actions. 
However, they are almost useless for in situ deployment of resources because they do not 
represent in detail what the final data end-users require for repairing damage (e.g. a GIS 
network map highlighting road closures is not useful to contractors that have to repair culverts, 
stop signs, etc). This situation becomes even more complex because some emergency 
response organisations purchase a GIS software without even analyzing whether or not the 
package will suit its needs during emergency events [23] [24] [15] [25]. 
• Recent telecommunication advances are already fundamental to emergency 
response. Wireless communications, internet and other integrated technologies for data 
exchange are now sufficiently developed to enhance response activities during disasters. 
Traditional short-wave radio and land-phone lines are not anymore the sole options in 
establishing communication links. Hybrid (combination of wireless and cellular networks) and 
satellite phone systems are currently operating in Japan and in the USA in order to avoid 
breakdowns, as observed during recent events (Kobe Earthquake and September 11 attacks in 
New York). Also, potential in combining telecommunication technologies to GIS, GPS and 
Remote Sensing tools has been reported in the scientific and technical literature. This allows 
on-line data sharing that would transform decision making during emergency response[27] [28] 
[29] [30] [31] [32].  
 
4.3 Evacuation studies 
A considerable part of the researched literature described techniques, methods and computer 
simulations related to evacuation of people living in damaged areas. The main findings [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] 
[38] [39] are as follows. 
• There are a large variety of evacuation planning packages and applications (EPlan; 
BTG, EXODUS, OREMS, PedGo, Assisted Evacuation Simulation, SEVEX, CyberSim, HLA, 
NEO, etc). They range from site analysis to large area studies in which evacuation times, 
casualities and resources are estimated. 
• The E-Team software package can be highlighted as a truly integrated 
data/information sharing tool for emergency management and evacuation 
matters. However, despite its well-structured framework that allows for the participation of 
all involved response parties in multi-level events, one of its drawbacks is the lack of access to 
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multiple organisation databases and decision-support routines required for the resource 
allocation/optimisation. 
• Evacuation modelling efforts, especially to predict evacuation behaviour, 
demonstrate the value of information in improving emergency manager’s 
decisions.  Better understanding of the characteristics of the affected population (such as 
wealth, levels of education, access to transport etc.) can significantly improve the ability of 
emergency managers to put in place appropriate measures. There are challenges, however, in 
that more situation specific information requires more complex modelling and it can be 
difficult represent human behaviour from basic rules-of-thumb or principles. 
Katrina Hurricane events (2005) have prompted a large variety of research efforts in evacuation 
studies. For example, Fu and Wilmot [40], Mitchell and Radawan [41] Chiu et al [42] have presented new 
modelling approaches to problems observed during the Katrina events.  
 
4.4 Lessons for New Zealand 
In the inter- and intra-organisational data/information sharing context, this review demonstrates 
that advances have been achieved, but considerable challenges ahead can be envisaged in terms of 
adopting knowledge and information management theory and techniques [40].  
Perhaps, the most difficult challenge is to move the focus from a technology-based approach to 
an organisation-oriented development of tools for helping those involved in emergency response. 
Many of the advances highlighted in this review have been driven by technology improvements and 
the desire to take advantage of the extra capabilities now available.   Very limited attention has been 
given to conducting comprehensive analyses of the nature and background of involved organisations; 
the characteristics of their involvement; their data/information needs; their data/information sharing 
needs; and how organisations could/should share data and information.  The main outcome of the 
technology-based approach is the development of tools that do not always meet the complex and 
diverse needs and requirements of emergency response organisations.  
An organisational-oriented development of tools will require that all involved parties understand 
that technology by itself will not solve the problem. Instead, there must be an acceptance that 
organisations need to interact and agree on joint response standards, responsibilities and protocols as 
well as on how to share data/information, in order to efficiently respond to emergency events. In 
summary, before creating/buying any technology, organisations must assess and discuss their 
emergency response operation needs. Also, organisations should make sure that their technology 
related arrangements are in alignment with others.  
These findings are in accordance with previous recommendations by New Zealand emergency 
management practitioners. For example, according to Neil Britton [26] “…a key need now is making 
effective and efficient use of new technologies for gathering and evaluating information to best target 
response and relief efforts…. Nevertheless, the challenge is to ensure the means exist for sharing 
information across all agencies, not just in terms of the formats used but also overcoming ownership 
and funding issues. Central to this, however, is the need to replace a focus on organisational 
arrangements to a focus on resource arrangements based on potential hazard consequences…”.  
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5.  Proposed Solutions for New Zealand 
Based upon the need for efficient inter- and intra-organisational data/information sharing, a 
conceptual framework for achieving this is proposed.  This framework was developed following the 
concepts of knowledge and information management [40].   
 When focusing on information sharing requirements, it is useful to consider information sources 
and needs during each phase of the response and recovery effort.  The Transit NZ response process can 
be divided into 6 core elements, these are: 
1. Event warning:  Some types of hazard, such as weather related events and distant 
source tsunamis have potential warning times.  External organisations such as Crown 
Research Institutes like National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA), 
Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS), Meteorological Services (MetService NZ), 
regional and local councils provide initial warning and updates of potential events; 
2. Event observation: For some types of hazard, such as earthquakes, we do not 
currently have the ability to predict their occurrence.  For these events, the response 
process starts at event observation.  The Contractor along with external organisations and 
the public verify the initial damage caused to the transportation system (pavement and 
bridge collapses, obstruction of lanes, damages to traffic signs and controls, etc.). 
Depending on the extent of damage, these conditions are reported to the Consultants, 
Transit NZ, Local Road Controlling Authorities, the emergency services and other 
lifeline organisations, or if a Civil Defence Emergency has been declared, the regional or 
national CDEM EOC; 
3. Event assessment: Depending on the type of the emergency, Transit NZ, the 
Consultant and Contractor, plus any supporting external organisations that can add 
expertise, are involved in collating information about the event and determining the best 
course of action; 
4. Organisation action: This involves the same organisations deploying their physical 
and personnel resources according to their responsibilities for undertaking response 
activities. Most of the field operation is conducted by the Contractors in small and 
medium events.  In large events the CDEM Controller, lifeline organisations and 
Local/Regional Authorities are also involved. These actions are supervised by the 
Consultant and Transit NZ; 
5. Organisation reporting: The Contractor, CDEM, Local/Regional Authorities and 
lifeline organisations report on current conditions after the initial round of measures and 
any further development of the original event (better information about damage, more 
events, etc.).   
6. Organisation re-evaluation: These reports are then taken into consideration during 
organisation re-evaluation, in which the organisation evaluates the measures taken and 
their efficiency. Finally, decisions are made as to whether to continue or stop response 
activities depending on the efficiency assessment. If a decision is made to continue, the 
process restarts again from event assessment. 
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The dynamic nature of emergency response is such that many elements of the response process 
are conducted simultaneously, and as the event develops, the appropriateness of different response 
strategies needs to be constantly re-evaluated. 
The next step in the process identified the information needs of the organisations involved in 
response. This was done by examining Transit NZ’s emergency procedures and reports and translating 
these using the Integrated DEFination (IDEF0) modelling language (semantics and syntax) [48], into a 
summary of information needs for each organisation involved in the response.  A summary of these 
information needs is shown in Table 2.  
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 Table 2. Transit NZ and response partners’ information needs in response activities 
 Regional Consultant info needs Regional Contractor info needs Transit NZ Regional Office info needs CDEM Group  info needs 
Event 
Occurrence 
Notification from the Regional Contractor, 
Transit NZ, police, community, etc. 
-Potential damaged area/region 
-Type of event 
-Intensity and expected duration 
-Available resources 
Notification from the Regional Contractor, Regional 
Consultant, police, community, etc. 
Notification from the Regional 
Contractor, Regional Contractor, 
Transit NZ, police, community, etc. 
Event 
Observation 
-Damaged area / region 
-Type of event  
-Damaged asset type  
-Partial or complete road closure 
-Alternative roads 
-Traffic flow composition 
-Contractors’ resources 
-CD emergency declaration? 
-Damaged area/region 
-Type of event 
-Attributes of potentially damaged 
assets (location; original condition; 
characteristics; costs; priority 
repair availability). 
 
-Damaged area/region and event type 
-Damaged asset type; 
-Partial or complete road closure 
-Alternative roads 
-Traffic flow composition 
-Contractors/Consultants’ available resources 
-Initial road closure time/ costs estimation 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
Notification from the Regional 
Contractor, Regional Contractor, 
Transit NZ, police, community, etc. 
Event 
Assessment 
Comparison before and after / damaged asset 
Location 
Original condition 
Characteristics 
Treatment options 
Costs 
Priority 
Repair availability 
-Contractors’ available resources 
Notification from the Regional 
Consultant informing that observed 
damage is being assessed. 
-Report on before and after / damaged asset 
-Summary of damaged assets per type 
-Summary of treatment options 
-Summary of Costs/Priorities 
Repair availability 
-Consultants and contractors available resources 
-Initial road closure time estimation 
-Initial cost estimation 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
-Report on road closures (Location; 
Partial/complete; Expected road 
opening 
-Consultants and contractors 
available resources 
-Initial cost estimation 
Organisation 
action 
-Location of Contractors’ equipment and 
personnel 
-Deployment times 
-Allocation plan of resources and personnel 
per damaged asset (location; original 
condition; characteristics; treatment; priority; 
effectiveness) 
-Traffic management plan 
MCDEM emergency declaration? 
-Allocation plan of resources and 
personnel per damaged asset (location; 
original condition; characteristics; 
treatment; priority; effectiveness) 
-Deployment times 
-Traffic management plan 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
Notification from the Regional Consultant informing 
the resource deployment plan and implementation 
progress.  
Notification from the Transit NZ 
Regional office informing the 
resource deployment plan and 
implementation progress 
Organisation 
reporting 
Damaged area/region 
-Attributes of damaged assets: (location; 
original/current conditions; characteristics; 
treatment; costs; priorities; repair availability) 
Damaged asset type  
Attributes of damaged assets: (location; 
original/current conditions; 
characteristics; treatment; costs; 
priorities; repair availability) 
-Partial or complete road closure 
-Alternative roads 
-Traffic flow composition 
-Contractors’ available resources 
-Damaged asset type  
-Partial or complete road closure 
-Alternative roads 
-Traffic flow composition 
-Contractors/Consultants’ available resources 
-Road closure time/costs estimation 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
 
Notification from the Transit NZ 
Regional office informing the 
outcomes of the implementation of 
the resource deployment plan. 
Organisation 
re-evaluation 
-Comparison before and after / damaged asset 
(location; original condition; characteristics; 
treatment options; costs; priority; repair 
availability) 
-Contractors’ available resources 
Stop response/Initiate Recovery 
mode/Continue Response? 
Notification from the Regional 
Consultant informing that the resource 
deployment is being re-assessed. 
-Report on before and after / damaged asset 
-Summary of damaged assets per type, treatment 
options, Costs and Priorities 
-Repair availability 
-Consultants and contractors available resources 
-Initial road closure time  cost estimation 
-Stop response/Initiate Recovery mode/Continue 
Response? 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
-Report on road closures (Location; 
Partial/complete; Expected road 
opening 
-Consultants and contractors 
available resources 
-Initial cost estimation 
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Based upon the need for efficient inter and intra organisational data/information sharing, a 
conceptual framework for achieving this is proposed.  This framework was developed following the 
concepts of knowledge and information management [40].  The first step in the process was to identify 
the information needs of the organisations involved in response. This was done by examining Transit 
NZ’s emergency procedures and reports and translating these using the Integrated Definition (IDEF0) 
modelling language (semantics and syntax) [48], into a summary of information needs for each 
organisation involved in the response.  A summary of these information needs is shown in Table 2.  
These information needs were considered in the conception of the data/information sharing 
framework [46] that is presented in Figure 12. The framework utilizes Transit NZ’s current inventory 
database (RAMM) to generate a Dynamic GIS (DGIS) for emergency response. In an emergency 
response event, the framework proposes that data from RAMM is dynamically retrieved, organized 
and distributed among Consultants, Contractors and Transit NZ using the DGIS. The data/information 
framework establishes the linkages, templates and sharing standards to enable the conversion of road 
maintenance data (RAMM) into information required during emergency response activities (DGIS).  
 
For example, during an emergency event with warning (e.g. flooding), the framework (see 
Figure 13) is applied following the steps and the representation below.  
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Step Representation 
1- Preliminary information on the 
potentially damaged region and 
assets is used by Transit NZ, 
Consultants and Contractors in 
generating data/information 
related to the potential 
emergency using RAMM and 
emergency response resources 
are placed on alert; 
 
 
2
 
 
R
A
M
M 
Consultant’s 
Office 
Transit NZ 
Control 
Room  
- Relevant information is then 
extracted from RAMM by the 
Consultant and linked to maps 
using DGIS; 
 
 
3- The Consultant alerts other 
possibly involved parties 
(MCDEM, Local and Regional 
Authorities, other lifeline 
organisations) and Transit NZ 
regional and national HQ offices;
 
4- The Contractor reaches the 
damaged road. Using DGIS-
PDA*, the contractor records the 
observed conditions of the 
damaged assets;  
 
Figure 13 – An example of response steps and their representation 
*PDA: Personal Digital Assistant.  
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STEP REPRESENTATION 
5- The observed conditions are 
summarized and Reported 
back to the Consultant via the 
DGIS database; 
 
 
6- Considering available 
resources recorded in the DGIS 
database, Consultant and 
contractors make Treatment 
Decision, which is shared with 
among them and with Transit 
NZ HQ; 
7- The Contractor Deploys 
Resources to implement the 
treatment; actual resource 
deployment is recorded into the 
DGIS-PDA; 
 
 
8- After the completion of the 
work, the Contractor compares 
before/after event conditions 
and conducts a Results 
Reporting, which is 
subsequently recorded into 
DGIS-PDA; 
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Figure 13 – An example of response steps and their representation (Continued) 
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STEP REPRESENTATION 
9- The Consultant retrieves data 
and conducts an Efficiency 
Assessment in which either the 
response is finalized (road 
opening) or continued; and 
10- If the response is continued, 
the Consultant re-starts the 
process from the Treatment 
Decision phase. Otherwise, the 
road segment is reopened to 
users. Contractors, Consultants, 
Transit NZ and other involved 
parties are informed of road 
reopening.   
Consultant’s 
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Table of Efficiency Assessment: 
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-Partial or complete road closure 
-MCDEM declaration? –Reopening time
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Figure 13 – An example of response steps and their representation (Continued) 
 
Transit NZ regional engineers can either act as observers for small events or become involved 
with the decision making process. For events without warning (e.g. car accidents; earthquakes; etc), 
the same phases are followed except for the initial preparation (Emergency tables preparation and 
Emergency resources preparation).  
During all the response phases, data is simultaneously shared with other involved organisations.  
The DGIS can be designed to have reports, matching pre-determined information needs, automatically 
collated and sent at regular intervals during the response and recovery effort. External organisations 
can also send information back, using predetermined formats that can be automatically uploaded and 
shared amongst Transit NZ’s Consultants and Contractors.   
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Figure 12 - Data/Information framework for roading organisations  
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6. Implementation Challenges and Opportunities 
This proposed DGIS information framework was applied in a desktop case study in the South 
Island of New Zealand to establish the approximate magnitude of potential benefits. Results show that 
a potential reduction in time and cost of emergency response activities could be reached if the 
conceptual framework was implemented through reduced response times, faster access to relevant 
information and therefore enhanced decision making. The total cost of road closures per year in New 
Zealand is estimated to be approximately NZ$2.9 million. By using the data/information framework, 
the road user waiting time cost of road closures could potentially be reduced by (in the best case) 5.5% 
(NZ$160,000) while the worst case scenario would generate a reduction of 1.7% (NZ$50,000) [46].  
These road user savings were estimated by taking the recorded road closure times for historic events 
and breaking these down into the different phases for road closure response and recovery: 
• External agency or police contact Consultants 
• Consultants contract Contractors 
• Contractor reach site of road closure 
• Contractors inform Consultants of actual site conditions 
• Decision made on repair strategy by Contractors and Consultants 
• Waiting time until conditions are suitable to undertake repairs 
• Complete repairs 
• Contractor reporting back to Consultants. 
Depending on the characteristics of the road closure event, the total road closure time was 
proportioned between each of these phases (for example taking into account the location of the road 
closure, traffic flows on the route, and the reasons for the road closure).  Estimates were then made 
about how the response times during each of these phases might be reduced with enhanced data and 
information sharing technologies. This desktop case study was only a preliminarily evaluation of the 
potential benefits of implementing a data and information sharing framework and does not consider at 
all the costs involved in implementing such a framework, but it clearly demonstrates that there are 
potentially significant savings possible through enhanced communications in emergency response. 
The implementation of such a framework would require personnel training, equipment purchase 
(PDA or mobile phones with GPS receiver units, PC data projectors for Transit NZ control rooms), 
considerable commitment in changing the organisational culture and further technological and 
methodological advances. Both training and equipment can be justified based upon the reduction of 
road-user costs by reopening roads more quickly, as well as the minimisation of social and economic 
disruption. Nevertheless, preliminary findings not only about Transit NZ but also other New Zealand 
organisations indicate that there is a need for clearer understanding and communication of intra-
organisational responsibilities and duties across divisional and geographical boundaries [47].  In 
particular, for the State Highway network, it is vital that Transit NZ, its Contractors and Consultants 
all have a shared understanding of what their roles and responsibilities will be during a large scale 
emergency event, and that all parties are involved in developing and testing emergency response plans.   
Specific organisational issues that need to be considered in the development of the framework 
include the impact of different types of contract in place across the Transit NZ regions.  The hybrid 
contract has a greater focus on Contractor autonomy in decision making, whereas the traditional 
contract makes greater use of Consultants.  The framework will need to accommodate the potential for 
an emergency spanning across two regions that are operating with different contracts and have the 
flexibility to fit with both end-user requirements.   
As for the technological and methodological advances, major disaster events require the 
manipulation of a large variety of data sets for national, regional, local and site specific levels. This 
has to be seriously taken into consideration because speed and size of each data set will certainly 
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influence the final data/information sharing outcome. Specific processing technology to efficiently 
manipulate the data sets has to be developed and implemented. The development of this technology 
will be the subject of ongoing research within this Resilient Organisations research programme.  We 
aim to have a prototype of such technology developed for user testing within the next 3 years.   
Fortunately, New Zealand has a solid culture of geospatial data collection and storage, which is 
provided by Land Information New Zealand (LINZ). Lifeline and other organisations could take 
advantage of LINZ’s data sources and know-how in order to accelerate the development of specific 
tools for emergency management.  
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7. Conclusions 
The challenges involved in co-ordinating an effective response to large scale events are 
compounded by the number and variety of organisations involved.  These complexities emphasise the 
need to develop robust yet simple frameworks for sharing information and communicating decisions 
within and between organisations involved in response and recovery activities.   
Considerable opportunities lie in exploring new paradigms for emergency response with 
extensive telecommunications and geo-spatial technologies.  Greater focus however is needed on 
defining data/information sharing requirements and how the characteristics of the organisations 
involved affect implementation.    
A major outcome of this research is that perceived barriers can be reduced if technology is 
employed according to an organisation’s needs rather than the other way around. This is possible by 
involving end-users during all development stages of the electronic data and information sharing 
framework to develop a framework that complements the organisational structures, cultures and 
existing interfaces between the organisations involved. 
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Appendix A – Transit NZ media release 
 
 
 
 
Hamilton Regional Office 
23 May 2005 
 
MEDIA RELEASE  
 
Further flooding affects highway cleanup 
 
Further flooding at Matata, west of Whakatane, over the weekend has resulted in 
more debris being deposited onto State Highway 2 where it passes through the town. 
Severe flooding last week deposited rocks, logs and debris across the township and 
washed out bridge approaches. Both the highway and railway remain closed.  
The additional weekend flooding will affect timeframes for reopening the highway, 
Transit New Zealand advises. 
Area Engineer Daya Govender said contracting staff had been making good progress 
clearing the highway and adjacent road reserve until heavy rain over the weekend 
pushed more debris onto the highway. 
“The contracting team has been hard at it since daybreak today, but it is too early to 
predict when the highway will reopen. That decision will have to be made later this 
week in conjunction with Civil Defence and other agencies involved in the clean-up.” 
ENDS 
 
NEWS MEDIA: For further information, contact: 
Daya Govender, Transit New Zealand, Ph 07 957 162 or  027 292 8075. 
 
www.transit.govt.nz
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Appendix B – Road Closure Maps 
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